

4 October 1966

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

**SUBJECT: DCI Meeting with the President's Foreign Intelligence  
Advisory Board, 29 September 1966**

1. The DCI met with the PFIAB in room 297 of the Executive Office Building at 1430 hours, 29 September. Mr. Clifford presided and General Taylor, Messrs. Langer, Gray, Pace, Ambassador Murphy, Admiral Sides and Dr. Baker were present, in addition to Messrs. Coyne, Bross and Ash.

2. The first item discussed were the reports from the Secretaries of State and Defense concerning gaps and deficiencies in coverage of intelligence in their respective areas of interest. Mr. Helms talked briefly about these papers which he said had been closely held in the Agency but discussed with a few senior officials responsible for intelligence guidance and requirements. He said that the community had little difficulty in identifying gaps and deficiencies. The problem is how best to eliminate these gaps and deficiencies and develop facilities and coverage required to resolve the more difficult intelligence problems. He said that he did not intend to attempt a lengthy analysis of the process by which requirements are identified and served on collection agencies. In essence, this process involves components of CIA, such as the Collection Guidance Staff, which serves as an intermediary between analytical components and collection agencies, and USIB committees such as JAEIC and GMAIC, which are concerned with high priority problem areas and are supposed to marshal the resources of the community in an effort to resolve questions relating to developments in the missile and nuclear energy fields. He said that he was prepared to leave with the Board a copy of the briefing paper which had been prepared by way of comment on the memoranda from the Secretaries of State and Defense. He offered the

suggestion that the Board address itself either through panels or individual members to an examination of how the USIB committees function in the requirements area. He felt that this might be the most constructive approach to the problem of the adequacy of existing procedures and arrangements for determining the needs of the Government for information and translating these needs into action designed to develop collection or analytical activity calculated to meet these needs.

3. The Chairman thought that this was a good suggestion. He said that the Board was divided into panels and that it might be helpful to have the panel charged with a particular area or function examine the USIB committee having jurisdiction over some problem identified as a gap. For example, deficiencies in our understanding of Chinese nuclear capabilities would be discussed with JAEIC. General Taylor said that the Board panels were organized on a geographic basis and would want to examine problems from a geographic perspective. It was left that specific arrangements for panel investigations would be discussed with Mr. Coyne.

4. The Chairman then brought up the DCI's letter of 20 September and asked the DCI to elaborate on some of the points made in that letter. (Mr. Coyne had left me with the impression that this letter would not be discussed and indeed the letter itself suggests that further consideration of the matters enumerated in the letter be postponed until later in the year.)

5. The first matter discussed related to the revision of NSCIDs, etc. The Chairman agreed that the course outlined in the letter was appropriate. The Director undertook, at General Taylor's suggestion, to put the NSCID relating to the allocation of responsibility in the economic field on the list for relatively early consideration and review.

6. The problem of the DCI's authority was then discussed at considerable length. Mr. Clifford initiated the discussion with a rather full analysis of the dilemma posed by the conflicting authorities and responsibilities of the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. The Director referred to his discussion with Senators Saltonstall and Russell and to Senator Russell's concluding remark that anybody who undertook to reduce and rationalize the intelligence budgets and prevent duplication would need

a lot of help. The DCI expressed his deep concern about the size of the intelligence budgets, which he estimated at [REDACTED] Members of the Board apparently had been given a higher figure of [REDACTED] which appears to have included some tactical intelligence activities.

7. There was considerable discussion about the appropriate allocation of authority to control expenditures. Mr. Clifford seemed to regard the dichotomy between the DCI and Secretary of Defense as perhaps inevitable. He thought that the President would probably turn to the DCI as responsible for decisions relating to intelligence programs but recognized that the DCI did not have the authority necessary to make final decisions concerning the level of funding of DoD programs which would require at least the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense.

8. General Taylor advanced the idea that it was really the Secretary of State who should be responsible for rationalizing the foreign intelligence effort as he is responsible for overseas activities and, under the new SIG, for coordinating and improving all foreign programs. The DCI pointed out that this might be true in certain areas but had no particular relevance to the big problems of SIGINT and overhead reconnaissance. Mr. Gray endorsed this thought and said that he was glad to get the conversation back to the problem of control of national intelligence at a governmental level.

9. As regards the necessity for a new letter of authority from the President, the DCI commented that while a new letter might not resolve any problems, the absence of a letter might have serious negative implications. Discussion followed about the differences between the Kennedy letter and the Johnson letter and it was agreed that the Kennedy letter was stronger. General Taylor had two suggestions which he thought might be helpful. One was to make th [REDACTED] responsible for the coordination of all intelligence in a given diplomatic mission. The other

[REDACTED]  
sensus of agreement. He referred to the SIG as the example of what he had in mind. (He did not refer to the Communications Board where the concept

12. The DCI then reverted to the problem of his relations with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He said that he had no hesitation about appearances before the full Committee for the purpose of briefings on substantive intelligence, etc. He was, however, concerned by the proposal that a small subcommittee be established to hold frequent regular meetings as these could very well infringe, or appear to infringe, on the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee. On this issue Mr. Clifford's conclusion was that the DCI should solicit Senator Russell's advice as regards appropriate action in the event of a proposal to create a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations to deal with CIA. Mr. Clifford agreed that the DCI should appear to brief the Committee as a whole, if asked to do so.

124. John A. Broad.

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<b>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY</b> <b>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>			
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20 SEP 1965

The Honorable Clark M. Clifford  
Chairman  
The President's Foreign Intelligence  
Advisory Board  
Executive Office Building

Dear Clark:

I am writing to report on the status of a number of matters which we discussed during the course of my meeting with the PFIAB on 29 July and to which I undertook to give further consideration or which otherwise involved further action on my part. I thought that a statement of what has been done on these items would be helpful before the next meeting of the Board, which I understand is scheduled for 29 and 30 September.

Item 1 of the last agenda, which concerned possible modification of the procedures governing the production of current and long range intelligence, has been disposed of. You have received a report describing new arrangements which have been completed for the purpose of more clearly identifying the component of the community originating a given intelligence issuance and indicating with more precision the degree of formal coordination which the issuance has received.

Item 2a of the agenda raised the question whether assignments of authority to the DCI are adequate to provide a basis for effective guidance, direction and coordination of the foreign intelligence activities of the Government. I asked for further time to consider this question. I also suggested that it would be very helpful to me to have the views of the Board as to what my authority should be and what further specific attempts, if any, it would seem profitable to make at this time to resolve the organizational dilemma created by the fact that something in excess of 80% of the resources devoted to foreign intelligence purposes are not under my direct managerial control.

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The letters from President Kennedy to Mr. McCone and from President Johnson to Admiral Raborn have created a precedent for the issuance of an express Presidential directive to each individual DCI. I believe these letters have helped to clarify the role of the DCI as a coordinator and have served a generally useful purpose. Significance has been attached in some quarters to differences in the language as between the letters issued by President Kennedy and President Johnson. This suggests the need for considerable care in drafting the language of a new letter, if it is decided that a new letter is desirable.

The most important question to decide is the extent and limitations of the responsibilities of the DCI, particularly insofar as they have managerial implications for programs functioning under agencies of the Government other than CIA, particularly under the Department of Defense. Specifically the questions are to what extent the DCI should be held responsible and accountable and given authority:

- a. To determine the needs of the Government for information derived from intelligence channels;
- b. To determine the scope, character and level of collection and analytical programs and facilities required to meet these needs; and
- c. For the efficiency and economy of these programs (now costing in excess of  a year).

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Under existing arrangements the DCI, supported and advised by USIB, tends to be regarded as primarily responsible for validating and determining the needs of the Government for intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense to be responsible for the control and management of a very large preponderance of programs and facilities calculated to meet these needs. The precise delimitations of authority and responsibility as between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI remain vague and ill-defined although practical working relationships are satisfactory. It may very well be that there is no practical alternative to the present dichotomy and that we should continue to work under current authority, recognizing the somewhat nebulous nature of the DCI's commitment "to provide effective guidance and coordination," but recognizing also that

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there has been a very considerable improvement in the coordination of the national intelligence effort and that further progress under something comparable to the existing authority can be reasonably anticipated.

Before expressing my final views on this subject, however, I should appreciate further time for reflection and suggest that this matter be scheduled for further discussion some time towards the end of this year. I am attaching a memorandum on the subject which may help further to clarify the issue.

Under agenda item 2b, I undertook to examine the NSCIDs and DCIDs and report my views as to whether a general review of these directives, or any of them, would be desirable at this time.

My general conclusion on this score is that, for the most part, existing directives make adequate provision for coordination and guidance of the community's efforts and resources. The understandings and arrangements for the allocation and discharge of responsibilities under current authorisations are realistic and provide a satisfactory basis for the community effort for at least the immediate future. Therefore, the relatively minor changes of an editing or updating nature that could be made might have a more disruptive than helpful effect.

Reviews of two NSCIDs [ ] and No. 8, photographic interpretation) and related DCIDs are in fact scheduled, although specific proposals for the amendment of these directives will have to await the completion of pending studies. We will press forward with these as diligently as possible.

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I will keep the balance of NSCIDs and DCIDs under continuing scrutiny with a view to ensuring that they are reviewed and amended at appropriate intervals. In the foreseeable future it will probably be desirable to re-examine the allocations of responsibility for the production of intelligence as presently provided for by NSCID 3.

I also undertook to give further consideration to the subject of item 2 h of the agenda, which concerns the practicality of establishing a mechanism for comprehensive field inspection of significant intelligence activities on a regional basis. I believe that there is much to be said for

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this proposal. Among other things, it would serve to strengthen the DCI's coordinating authority and expand his knowledge of the details and interrelationships of intelligence activities in priority areas. Implementation of the proposal, however, poses serious administrative problems which require further consideration. Also, I believe that this proposal is closely related to some of the problems discussed in connection with consideration of the adequacy of the DCI's coordinating authority. Accordingly, I again suggest that this matter be deferred until it can be considered as part of the over-all question of the authority appropriate for the DCI and the institutional arrangements best suited to implement this authority.

One final matter which was not included in the formal agenda of the last meeting of the Board was your suggestion that I bring myself up to date with the status of the Knox Panel. Since our last meeting, representatives of my office and I myself personally have had the benefit of a number of very helpful discussions with Mr. Knox, and I look forward to the issuance of his report which I believe is now scheduled for some time in the late fall.

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms  
Director

Attachment

JABROSS:ag (19/9/66)

Distribution:

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1 - DCI  
1 - ER  
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**Discussion of Adequacy of DCI Authority to**  
**Coordinate the U. S. Intelligence Effort**

As a minimum, the DCI must have the authority to find out anything he wants to know about all activities which contribute to national intelligence. He must have the ability to form an independent judgment as to whether intelligence programs are generally responsive to national needs. Institutional arrangements must exist which ensure that he can communicate an authoritative view, if necessary to the President and the President's immediate advisers, as to which programs of the Government are redundant or marginal and what should be done to fill intelligence gaps.

The law and NSCID No. 1 provide, in a general way, this authority and institutional arrangement. The law provides that the Agency, of which the DCI is the head, shall advise the NSC on intelligence matters and recommend ways to improve intelligence coordination. NSCID No. 1 provides that the DCI "shall coordinate the foreign intelligence activities of the United States in accordance with existing law and NSCIDs." NSCID No. 1 confers other authority on the DCI, generally subject to consultation with USIB, to do various things. For example, the DCI or his representatives "in consultation with the head of the intelligence agency concerned" is authorized to make surveys of departmental intelligence activities.

The two Presidential letters, respectively to Mr. McCone and Admiral Raborn, constitute at least a clarification and probably an extension of the DCI's authority. Certainly the Kennedy letter constitutes a mandate to the DCI, acting jointly with the heads of departments, to review the activities of all U. S. agencies "with a view to assuring efficiency and effectiveness . . ." It has been argued that the Johnson letter is weaker because it directs the DCI to coordinate and guide the total United States intelligence effort "in accordance with NSCID No. 1." Certain of the provisions of NSCID No. 1 imply a certain obligation on the part of the DCI to act, in some respects at least, with the advice and consent of USIB and to deal with heads of agencies and departments through their intelligence representatives. The Johnson letter also uses language which appears to emphasize the DCI's responsibility for coordinating intelligence output, rather than intelligence programs and activities.

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In view of the practice that has developed of giving the DCI a personal mandate from the President, a new letter of authority, emphasizing the President's concern with the need for effective guidance to the over-all intelligence effort and directing the new DCI to ensure the provision of this guidance, may be desirable.

It remains to be asked whether the Board expects the DCI to be responsible for more than general guidance and coordination for intelligence activities. Do they expect to hold him accountable for the efficiency of all intelligence activities. Do they expect him to be responsible for the elimination of all waste and extravagance in any intelligence program run by the Government.

As of today, there is no central mechanism in the Government for an over-all budgetary or program review of all intelligence activities as a whole. The four basic programs: CIA, the CCP (SIGINT), the CIP (DIA and the Service intelligence programs), and the National Reconnaissance Program are all reviewed separately with somewhat different representation through somewhat different channels. It should be recognized, however, that the DCI's right to participate in the review and have a say in the formulation of all three DoD programs is now firmly established.

Consideration has been given in the past to the desirability of establishing a National Intelligence Resources Board, to be chaired by the DCI or jointly by him and the Secretary of Defense which would be responsible for the consolidated review and approval of all intelligence programs. There are many practical considerations, however, which suggest that such an arrangement may be unwise or, in any event, premature.

A basic factor affecting the coordination of intelligence activities is the necessary division of authority amongst individual departments and agencies of Government. It is inevitable and appropriate that heads of departments having responsibilities in the foreign policy fields and commanders of major military commands should have the personnel and facilities required to assemble and analyze the information needed for their parochial and departmental purposes. Information which they legitimately require is also, in most cases, relevant to national

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decisions which affect "national security." Moreover, intelligence data of national significance is collected by individuals, diplomats for example, as part of their official responsibility for carrying out normal departmental activities. Intelligence, whether national or departmental, is very often a by-product of some essentially non-intelligence activity controlled and conducted by non-intelligence components of the Government.

It follows that all of the activities and components of the Government which serve national intelligence purposes can never be totally subordinated to the direction, control and management of a single central authority. Added efficiency would be given to the DCI as a coordinator by subordinating NSA and, through NSA, the cryptologic military services, to the DCI. This was the original recommendation of the Brownell report, but was rejected as impractical by the then DCI (General Bedell Smith). Exhaustive reviews of the constituent responsibilities of the NRO served to emphasize the impracticability of totally subordinating reconnaissance programs, including their support facilities, launch pads, tracking and recovery facilities, etc., to the managerial authority of the DCI. Even if these two large and probably indigestible ingredients were added to the DCI's personal command, he would still have to cope with the problem of coordinating a number of activities which cannot, under any circumstances, ever be placed under his direct managerial supervision.

The net result of all this suggests that we are stuck with the present concept under which the DCI "guides and coordinates" the community but does not manage or command it. If so, the various institutional arrangements through which the DCI provides guidance and coordination (USIB, intelligence agency program and budget reviews, the NRO, etc.) should be examined to ensure that they provide an adequate basis for the assertion of his influence but do not imply responsibilities which extend beyond the limitations on his authority.

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<p><b>Remarks:</b></p> <p>The annexed is a proposed letter to Clifford by way of a status report on outstanding agenda items. I talked to Pat Coyne about this and told him that it would be forthcoming shortly. You may not wish to send the memorandum discussing the problem of DCI authority, which is annexed to the letter. It may, however, be helpful to give the PFIAB something to chew on.</p> <p align="center">[Signature]</p>					
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John A. Cross, D/DCI/NIFE, 7 E 22				19/9/66	
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